

63. Gladstone Mills, "The English-Speaking Caribbean," in Subramanian, 317-351; Unnathy, "Designing Bureaucracy."

64. Gelfase Mutabala, "Controlling the Power of Public Bureaucracies: Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia in Comparative Perspective," in Jain; Gytynah-Bundi and Rothchild, "Clans."

65. According to R. Baker, the colonial public administration, "under its guise of neutrality and objectivity, became an instrument of system maintenance rather than any substantial change." See Baker, "The Role of the State," 357.

66. M. Shamsul Haque, "Globalization of Market Ideology and its Impact on Third World Development" (paper presented at the IAS (Brussels) International Congress, Dubai, 1-5 July, 1995); Baker, "The Role of the State"; Brenda Martin, *In the Public Interest: Privatization and Public Sector Reform* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1993); Walden Bello, Shen Cunningham, and Bill Ram, *Dark Victory: The United States, Structural Adjustment, and Global Poverty* (London: Pluto Press, 1994); Henry Veltmeyer, "Liberalisation and Structural Adjustment in Latin America: In Search of an Alternative," *Economic and Political Weekly* (September 25, 1993).

67. For analysis of a self-reliance model, see J. Ann Tickner, "Local Self-Reliance Versus Power Politics: Conflicting Priorities of National Development," *Alternatives* 11 (October 1986); Rajit Kothari, "Classes, Classes and the State," *Alternatives* 11 (April 1986).

68. See Unnathy, "Designing Bureaucracy"; David Hirschmann, "Development or Underdevelopment Administration? A Further 'Deadlock,'" *Development and Change* 12 (July 1981).

69. From various studies, it has been found that public bureaucracies in Malaysia, India, Zambia, and Lebanon are overrepresented by the dominant racial, religious, or language groups. In India, for instance, Muslims constitute 12 percent of the population, but they occupy only 4 percent of the total civil service and 2 percent of the higher civil service. See Peter Hertz, *Foundations of Public Administration: A Comparative Approach* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1990), 197; Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, 101.

Research Note

This paper draws upon texts on development during the colonial and the postwar period, and on conservation today, to elucidate some of the similarities in ideologies that underlie these writings. The paper suggests that despite differences there are interesting, sometimes striking, affinities in these discourses, and that the roots of the correspondences can be traced to the project of progress. The paper highlights themes that presume the powerlessness of the objects of development and conservation. It goes on to suggest that an ethically acceptable face of conservation requires greater autonomy and free play to the preferences of local users of resources, even if such autonomy does not lead to efficient conservation.

THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION: LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM¹

by Arun Agrawal

Development has been the watchword of the economic policies of most nations in the postwar period. It has successfully, and ubiquitously, colonized the imagination of intellectuals interested in human welfare. Indeed, it is difficult to even imagine improvements in the well-being of humans in the impossible vacuum that would be left behind by abolishing the word. As Esteva suggests, "[d]evelopment occupies the center of an incredibly powerful semantic constellation. There is nothing in modern mentality comparable to it as a force guiding thought and behavior."²

Over the past two decades, however, the notion of development has begun to increasingly come under fire. One of the most potent weapons that has emerged to permit successful interrogation of "development" is environmental conservation. Theorists elaborating on the necessity of conservation view themselves ranging against the proponents of development and growth. Ehrlich and Ehrlich, prolific writers on the dangers of overpopulation and vocal

defenders of the global environment, suggest that the way development is sought today by rich and poor nations alike can only lead to unmitigated environmental disasters in short order.⁷

The incompatibility of the two streams of thought is demonstrated in the attempts to conjoin development and conservation which lead only to questionable shibboleths such as "sustainable development." The perils of environmental degradation can be invoked whenever one wishes to condemn development and question the presumed benefits it confers on its recipients. Indeed, conservation has surfaced as another idea that possesses the potential to influence human thought and behavior in a manner similar to the notion of development.

Acknowledging the wide dissimilarities that separate conservation from development, this paper still seeks to highlight affinities in the discourses that surround the two concepts. More specifically, it seeks to underscore some historical correspondences that coexist in discourses around conservation and development, themes that date back to the colonial period. That these themes continue in contemporary conversations is as surprising as their relative invisibility, or, perhaps, their continuity is an indication of their normal invisibility. To investigate these patronizing and dominating motifs, which Spurr refers to as "colonial gestures," the paper first examines some of the rhetoric about development from the colonial period.⁸ The next section focuses on development writings to suggest that scholars of development after the Second World War are also prone to making similar assertions and claims. Finally, I analyze some contemporary works on conservation to find in them resonating strains.

COLONIAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT

Writing in 1931, Albert Sarraut, former governor general of French Indo-China, found mankind confronted by a dilemma: "While in a narrow corner of the world nature has concentrated in white Europe the powers of invention, the means of progress, and the dynamic of scientific advancement, the greatest accumulation

of natural wealth is locked up in territories occupied by backward races who, not knowing how to profit by it themselves, are even less capable of releasing it to the greater circular current that nourishes the ever growing needs of humanity."⁹ Cloaked in the garb of progress, and the greater good of humanity, Sarraut's observation does not quite manage to conceal the imperial impatience when confronted by obstacles in alienating resources controlled by the "backward races." In highlighting the identity between human development and the objectives and activities of Western white populations, the passage reveals the deeply held belief of Western administrators and scientists that it was the white race that stood at the helm of progress. Consider, for example, the American writer, Richard Davis, who visited Honduras in 1896. He asserts: "There is no more interesting question of the present day than that of what is to be done with the world's land which is lying unimproved; whether it shall go to the great power that is willing to turn it to account, or remain with its original owner, who fails to understand its value. The Central Americans are like a gang of semi-barbarians in a beautifully furnished house, of which they can understand neither its possibilities of comfort nor its use."¹⁰

We see in these writings the classic attempt at fusing narrow self-interest with global visions about the improvement of humanity. But although there may be elements of self-serving rationalization concealed in such beliefs, it would be a mistake to assume that imperialist writers were simply hypocrites who asserted the burden of the white man, but whose real designs were focused exclusively on appropriating the resources in tropical colonies. Undoubtedly, the lure of riches played an important role in the construction of rhetorics and policies that demanded Western intervention. But a complex process of rationalization went into equating the welfare of the colonies with that of the mother country, to a point where it becomes impossible, often, to separate self-serving epithets from the desire to "do good."

A widespread belief existed among most writers during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the white races were superior, and that they were entrusted with the mission to unleash

progress' on the world. The examples cited above are not isolated instances, caricaturing the beliefs just of colonial intellectuals, administrators and travelers. In writing after writing, and observation after observation from this period, we find the same themes. These statements reflect the beliefs of an era. Thus, James Mill believed fervently in the amoral character of the Hindus and the Chinese and suggested: "Both nations are to nearly an equal degree tainted with the vices of insincerity; dissembling, treacherous, mendacious, to an excess which surpasses even the usual measure of uncultivated society."⁹ Yet, these nations could improve themselves, under the enlightened tutelage of Europeans. Indeed, as J. B. Say remarks, the Europeans had a duty to civilize backward nations. "It is 'in the interests of the human species' that the advanced European nations must keep and even increase their influence in Asia... it is evident that 'with its despots and superstitions, Asia has no good institutions to lose' but 'she could receive many good ones from the Europeans.'"¹⁰

Nor were thinkers on the left immune to such sentiments during this period. As the French socialist Rouanet suggested, there was no reason why "the peoples of the civilized European and American countries [who] find themselves before enormous expanses... should not use these expanses to better the economic existence of their countries."¹¹ Even Marx, as he condemned colonialism on moral grounds, believed, at least in his pre-1860s writings, in the progressive dynamic of capitalism which would only be introduced in backward parts of the world by a triumphant imperialism.¹²

Ignoring the spectacular racism and arrogance that such writings reveal, we find at least three common themes that are of relevance to the argument in this paper: (1) tropical colonies of the West possessed the necessary raw materials and natural resources for progress, development and enlightenment; (2) the peoples inhabiting these regions were, however, incapable of embarking on journeys toward progress on their own; (3) therefore, the inhabitants of the Western nations, who in some sense controlled the ability to release the dynamic of development, had the duty to provide the necessary techniques and institutions to further enlightened

progress in these underdeveloped regions. If such a course necessitated taking over the resources that these countries possessed, that should not be cause for hesitation.

The three themes are explicitly recognized in the idea of the "dual mandate" of British colonial rule.¹³ British colonial policy aimed at the development of the conquered region economically, but also looked to the mental and physical well-being of the native.¹⁴ The naturalization of a posited identity between developing resources in the colonies for the benefit of the mother country and the progress of humanity in general was also facilitated by the teleological optimism of enlightenment beliefs in progress and development.¹⁵ It is perhaps not so surprising that in much of the literature that talks about progress in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially in reference to the colonies, these three themes find common ground.¹⁶ Indeed, it can be argued that with some variation, the same convictions have powered the impulses behind most of the pronouncements of the development industry since the end of the Second World War.

DEVELOPMENT IN THE POSTCOLONIAL PERIOD

In his inaugural address in 1949, President Harry S. Truman partially echoed Sarraut and others who felt that Western science and theory would be indispensable to achieve development. "We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefit of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."¹⁷

Although, as Cowen and Shenton point out, the doctrine of development was old before its invocation by Truman,¹⁸ his words are useful to remember that most of the current development literature appeals to the logic of aid and help and argues for the critical role of aid to induce development in the Third World. But there is one vital difference from the earlier colonial literature. The later literature on development, even as it implicitly recognizes the presence of resources and raw materials in the developing world, does not explicitly remark on them, or consider them necessary for

development. Thus, we have moved beyond the stage where theorists suggested that raw materials and natural resources in the Third World are by themselves sufficient for development. In fact, if the examples of economic transformations in Southeast and East Asia possess any meaning, it may seem that an abundance of natural resources is not even a necessary condition for development. Most of the underdeveloped countries are abundantly endowed with natural resources—what they lack is the requisite expertise which lies primarily in the Western countries.

This attitude underlies the activities, reports, even the logic of existence of many of the major aid agencies of the world—the IMF, the World Bank, or the USAID.¹⁹ With the notable exception of dependency theorists, it is ubiquitously present in all the different streams of the development discourse since the 1950s. From the various plans created for the development of backward areas, to discussions on the kinds of expertise needed for development, it was clear the developing world lacked the ability to develop itself. Whether development depended on adequate supplies of capital, of technology, or trained human beings, the underdeveloped world was deficient in these and needed to look to the West to gain them.²⁰ It perhaps could not be otherwise when the very definition of these terms and their referents was seen as the purview of Western writers.

In a review of development literature in 1990, Gabriel Almond recapitulated the objectives of modernization theorists during the 1950s and the 1960s:

The "new," the "emerging," the "underdeveloped" or "developing nations" as they were variously called challenged the classificatory talents and theoretical imaginations of western social scientists. They brought in this effort to illuminate the prospects of the third world the ideas and concepts of the enlightenment and nineteenth and early twentieth century social theory, which had sought to make sense out of European and American modernization. The "progress" promised by the enlightenment—the spread of knowledge, the development of technology, the attainment of higher standards of material welfare, the emergence of lawful, humane, and liberal policies, and the perfection of the human spirit—now beckoned the third world, newly freed from colonialism and

exploitation, and straining against its own parochialisms. The challenging question confronting scholars of the 1950s and 1960s was how these new and developing nations would find their way into the modern world.²¹

It is in response to such assessments of the relationship between modernity and the postcolonial world that Chatterjee caustically observes that the postcolonial world seems to be destined to remain a consumer of modernity, even its imaginations colonized forever.²² More specifically, in the different discourses that collectively comprise development studies, the emphasis on the need to develop backward areas (underdeveloped countries) goes together with the impossibility of development without concurrent technical, scientific, or financial assistance from the developed Western world. While one may expect to find such sentiments primarily in the earlier postwar writings on development, even later theorists seem hostage to imaginations rooted in the colonial period. Whether we consider the more mainstream writers writing from a modernization perspective and those who believed in the desirability and efficacy of economic growth, or focus on later modifications and challenges in the shape of writings stressing "basic needs," "appropriate technology," "participatory development," "sustainable development," "indigenous knowledge," and so forth, our analysis would reveal similar themes.²³ Instead of examining each of these literatures in detail, I will focus in particular on theorists who advocate indigenous knowledge. It should prove the most difficult to find in their writings the themes that I suggest underlie the project of development: that development is desirable for the inhabitants of erstwhile colonies, that they, by themselves are incapable of developing, and that Western capital/ knowledge/technology is essential for development. Narratives of indigenous knowledge, of all the different discourses that the development industry has produced, valorize local knowledge, the subaltern, and local institutions, and question the importance of science or Western strategies of development the most.

Advocates of indigenous knowledge believe that much of the development industry has been misguided in its emphasis on introducing Western knowledge to bring about development. In an

attempt to provide a thorough-going critique of modernist development, these scholars criticize development on multiple grounds. It relies, they suggest, on externally introduced, massive, centralized projects that seek to provide a technical fix for problems of development and seldom take into account the needs and abilities of people. Modernist development, they also argue, creates as many problems for the poor as its claims to solve, and ends up ultimately by expanding the powers of the state and existing institutions.

On closer examination these scholars also, paradoxically, reveal their reliance on the same project of influence and control that they initially seem to reject. According to the editorials of the *Indigenous Knowledge and Development Monitor*—"a publication of and for the international community of people who are interested in indigenous knowledge"—indigenous knowledge should be gathered, documented, and disseminated in a coherent and systematic fashion. The various studies on indigenous knowledge should be archived in national and international centers as databases. The collection and storage in internationally accessible archives should be supplemented with adequate dissemination and exchange among interested parties through newsletters, journals, and other networks.²¹

The contradictions in such a position are evident. Believers in the efficacy of indigenous knowledge ironically appeal to Western science, to Western experts, and to Western methods to authorize indigenous knowledge. While they criticize science for being inaccessible to local peoples and irrelevant to local needs because of its origins in bureaucratized institutions and its orientation towards abstract analysis,²² they suggest the very same strategies for preserving indigenous knowledge and for making it more effective in the service of development: systematic collection, documentation, and storage in a system of international archives.²³

Equally ironically, they suggest that to be considered valid indigenous knowledge must first be checked using scientific principles. Indigenous knowledge may be considered effective by local populations, but without testing true on the touchstone of science, it cannot be accepted as real knowledge. Works praising indigenous

technology, or ethnomedical knowledge, consistently betray a lingering Baconian belief in the desirability of science to validate indigenous knowledge.²⁴ The techniques of validation for indigenous knowledge, thus, ultimately come from the West, either in the shape of institutional arrangements that would systematize the locally scattered knowledge, or in the form of scientific testing and control, without which indigenous knowledge can mislead and thereby prove deficient in ensuring development.

The flawed vision of progress and development that dates back to colonial writings seems, thus, also to motivate later works.²⁵ Beliefs in the desirability of development, in the underdeveloped (backward) nature of the erstwhile colonies, in the necessity of transfers of science and technology, in the crucial role of Western intervention, ultimately can be discerned in writings on development. In a sense, these writings are tautological and they commit themselves to repeating the same vision by dividing the world into two polarized parts: the developed and the underdeveloped. If there does exist an underdeveloped world, it must possess some flaws because, and here a circular argument inserts itself, if there were no flaws, why would underdevelopment exist at all? Underdevelopment, by definition, becomes a pathological condition in which the patient does not exercise any control; s/he must wait for the appropriate medication, administered by the suitably trained physician. Even where development writings seem to transcend this productive dynamic of dependence and aid, they ultimately remain bound by it—as the writings of indigenous knowledge theorists indicate.

CONSERVATION AND THE BIODIVERSITY CRISIS

In reviewing the literature on conservation we find that theorists have described a full circle. The progressive mission that Western colonizers had to fulfill to develop the forces of production in the colonies now is displaced on to the need to conserve natural resources. And now, once again, resources that require conservation are located in the tropical countries of the Third World; these resources constitute mankind's patrimony—so the argument goes

—and are being squandered by the countries that possess them; the only hope for conservation lies in massive research and transfers of technological expertise to the countries that possess biological resources."⁷ The biodiversity crisis, which perhaps excites conservationists the most, and writings regarding the crisis, constitute the locus of discussion for this section.

While the exact dimensions of the crisis are under dispute, its presence and seriousness is an established fact. An enormous, and proliferating literature gives witness to Myers' pronouncement: "There is strong evidence that we are into the opening stages of an extinction spasm. That is, we are witnessing a mass extinction episode, in the sense of a sudden and pronounced decline worldwide in the abundance and diversity of ecologically disparate groups of organisms. . . . Moreover, whereas past extinctions have occurred by virtue of natural processes, today the exclusive cause is *Homo sapiens*, who eliminates entire habitats and complete communities of species in super-short order. It is happening in the twinkling of an evolutionary eye."⁸

Further, writers on biodiversity agree that it primarily exists in the tropics, especially tropical forests and that the loss is a matter for the gravest human concern.⁹ To take just one example, according to Wilson, "Biological diversity must be treated more seriously as a global resource, to be indexed, used, and above all preserved. Three circumstances conspire to give this matter an unprecedented urgency. First, exploding human populations are degrading the environment at an accelerating rate, especially in tropical countries. Second, science is discovering new uses for biological diversity. . . . Third, much of the diversity is being irreversibly lost through extinction caused by the destruction of natural habitats, again especially in the tropics. Overall we are locked into a race. We must hurry to acquire the knowledge on which a wise policy of conservation and development can be based for centuries to come."¹⁰

The old colonial logic already starts becoming apparent in these writings. Biodiversity is an exceptionally important resource for humanity's future, and constitutes, as it were, "mankind's patrimony."¹¹ Much of it, certainly the more valuable parts of it, lie in the

tropics—unassessed, unindexed, unknown. The tropical countries possess neither the financial resources, nor the scientific/technical know-how to explore the riches embodied in the resources they control. The knowledge and other resources to protect biodiversity can only come from the West and Western scientists. As Ehrlich tells us using an imaginative metaphor: "It is as if the poor of the world own the wings of our aeroplane and one of the things they must do is pry the rivets from the wings one by one and sell them. It would clearly be worth the while of the first class passengers to share the wealth with the owners of the wings so that the poor would not have to sell the wings to survive."¹² Robinson, in a thoughtful editorial in the journal *Conservation Biology* is succinct, however, on this subject, "The developed nations can provide the economic solutions to Third World environmental problems, through financial and technical aid."¹³

Indeed, the solutions could come only from Western countries because the policies of governments in tropical countries,¹⁴ as well as their exploding populations, are seen as responsible for the destruction of the global heritage. Western scientists, as the protectors of nature and advocates of conservation, suggest that biodiversity should be defended by creating large parks and reserves. But "growing throngs of impoverished peasants spreading into every last corner of wildlife habitat" are the principal threat to biodiversity.¹⁵ These peasants possess little foresight, and to satisfy their short-term subsistence interests, they are threatening future survival. The long-term threat is to the West because the treasures of tropical biodiversity "can make a significant contribution to modern agriculture . . . medicines and pharmaceuticals, and to industrial processes . . . especially in the advanced countries with (their) greater capacity to exploit genetic resources."¹⁶ Underdeveloped countries with limited scientific and technical resources, it can easily be argued, do not know how best to actualize the potential of the genetic treasures they control.

Scientific capacity to "generalize and predict, and ultimately control,"¹⁷ and the technical superiority in harnessing benefits derived from research in biotechnology remain the basis on which

the West lays claim to the tropics. As Wilson tells us, "biologists have begun to fill volumes with concrete proposals for the further exploration and better use of (bio)diversity, and with increasing emphasis on the still unexplored portions of the tropical biota."⁴⁰ The emerging solution of internationally enforceable rights to property in biotechnological innovation points to the significance the West and elites in developing countries attach to control over genetic resources.

Janzen and many other conservationists go a step further and advocate that biologists, as the "representatives of the natural world" should be "in charge of the future of tropical ecology."⁴¹ According to Western, "if the biodiversity crisis is real, as biologists insist, then surely it demands Big Science geared to conservation. Such a crisis calls for immediate measures, not didactic trickle-down science. Identification, safeguard and rescue; theory, criteria, science. . . . The case for conserving biodiversity has gained legitimacy. What it lacks is scientific leadership."⁴² James Scheuer, chairman of the Subcommittee on the Environment (U.S. House of Representatives) tells us from where the scientific leadership will come—the West. "The time has come to act before decline of species become crisis situations. We need to strengthen endangered species laws worldwide, but we also need to supplement them with equally strong biodiversity legislation. We need to inventory biological resources and their status, and to identify species and ecological communities of outstanding value. With this knowledge we can begin to plan for the sustainable management of our resources. We can take measures to protect 'hotspots' containing sensitive species or critical ecosystems."⁴³

The authors whose words I cite—Ehrlich, Janzen, Myers, and Wilson—are leaders among advocates of biodiversity conservation. In their writings, and those of many others, once again one observes the desire to control the tropics and what happens there in the name of the global interests of humanity. The rhetoric of "one earth, one future"⁴⁴ receives new meaning under the weight of the environmental imperative, a meaning quite distinct from that attached to enlightenment conceptions of humanity moving

toward a common future. But it serves traditional aims that ultimately privilege science, centralized control, and transfers of knowledge, technology, and institutions to the Third World. It simultaneously undermines the agency of local actors in these countries.

ASSESSING THE LONGEVITY OF THE RHETORIC OF CONTROL

If the themes we examine are indeed present in the three discourses the paper discussed, the interesting question is, "Why?" What accounts for their longevity over nearly two centuries of reflection and consideration about these issues? Given that these themes have survived over such a long period, that they reside in discourses that in some senses can be seen to exist in opposition to each other, that the colonial gestures Spurr speaks of have persisted despite the formal end of colonial empires, it seems obvious that one must search for possible explanations in a history that is not specific to development or conservation. This paper only hints at one possible direction where a provisional answer may lie.

I suggest that the reasons behind the similarity of themes in discourses as disparate as development (in its two forms) and conservation, must be sought in the very logic of progress and a teleological history itself. If we concur that a prime concern of modernity is with order, we see the expression of this concern in the domination of nature by reason,⁴⁵ by way of "design, manipulation, management and engineering." These are familiar words to those interested in development and conservation. As Goldberg suggests, "the spirit of modernity is to be found most centrally in its commitment to continuous progress: to material, moral, physical, and political improvement and to the promotion and development of civilization."⁴⁶ If domination of nature by reason (and science) is synonymous with the narrative of moral and material progress, it is not difficult to see how the good ethico-political end can be identified with superior knowledge.⁴⁷

Faith in progress and development during the colonial period and in conservation today, could not have come about without more and better knowledge. The West was able to colonize other regions of the world because of its superior knowledge in techniques of control and warfare, and because its superior knowledge allowed it greater power. Its faster development during the same period was similarly a result of what Truman called "our scientific advances and industrial progress." Superiority in knowledge provides the West the possibility of guiding development. Unequal relations of power—political and economic—in the international system provide it with the capacity to guide development.

The imperative of conservation is similarly a product of greater knowledge that the West possesses. Without science, and the capacities it creates for data collection, analysis, explanation, and prediction, it would perhaps not even be possible to know of many of our environmental problems. Increases in concentrations of carbon-dioxide, depletion of the ozone layer, accelerating global deforestation, reduction of biodiversity—these are truths that science reveals. Western scientists and politicians already know why conservation is necessary (even if Western industrialists balk at the necessity). The actions of those who do not inhabit the Western space and imagination indicate they have not understood the same truths. They must be taught. Since they do not share in the stream of consciousness with which enlightenment endows its participants they are quite unable to articulate, or even imagine their interests. Like Marx's peasants, "they must be represented."⁴⁸

The history of development over the past several decades suggests however, that those who seem unable to represent themselves can also not be represented by others. Their material well-being may be a matter of concern to others; yet others are only infrequently successful in actually changing the material circumstances of the unrepresented for the better. Strategies that privilege external, centralized control are unlikely to achieve the ends desired by their creators. The short history of conservation efforts in the shape of national parks and conservation areas that attempt to keep

humans out tells a similar story. In the desire to ensure scientific conservation, it may be easy to disinherit those whose lands are seen to possess exceptional value. Such attempts, however, are unlikely to find much success. An ethically acceptable face of conservation requires greater autonomy and freer play to the preferences of local users of resources, even if such autonomy does not lead to efficient conservation.

CAUTIONARY NOTES AS CONCLUSION

Given the broad domain of the arguments, it seems appropriate to end the paper on two cautionary notes. First is the question whether it is necessary to query the significance of objectives such as development and conservation? The discussion I present about ethnocentric and patronizing themes in the discourses surrounding development and conservation, it should be clear, does not cast doubt on the misery that is the home of billions of human beings, or on the potential environmental disasters in the making. The paper seeks, rather, to highlight a historical legacy, and the blindness to this legacy for the most part, in the use and advocacy of particular strategies to achieve development and conservation. It examines some of the specific ways in which theorists imagine solutions to these problems, solutions that usually envision an object of development who is powerless, or strategies of conservation that grant control to specific actors over others.

Second, in underlining similar themes of domination and control, patronization and aid, the paper does not mean to suggest that the examined discourses are monolithic, or without any internal faultlines. Indeed, as I have indicated in footnotes throughout this paper, dissenting voices constantly strive to be heard, eddies to the main movements of historical imagination attempt persistently to shift the flow. When such attempts move beyond being mere footnotes to history, perhaps it will also become possible to develop and conserve in ethically more attractive ways.

NOTES

1. This is a substantially revised version of a paper presented at the 90th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 1-4, 1994, New York. I would like to thank my panel participants for their constructive engagement. At this time I also acknowledge the support and help I received from Sabine Engel, Kimberly Pfleger, and Suzanna Sawyer during the process of writing this paper. Paula Jewells has my gratitude for her assistance with the manuscript.
2. C. Esteva, "Development," in *The Development Dictionary*, W. Sachs, ed. (London: Zed, 1993).
3. F. Ehrlich and A. Ehrlich, *Extinctions: Causes and Consequences of the Disappearance of Species* (New York: Random House, 1981).
4. D. Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and Imperial Administration* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).
5. As quoted in Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire*, 29.
6. As quoted in Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire*, 31.
7. In talking about "unkensling" progress, I have in mind the angel of history as described by Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968). "A Klee painting named 'Angelus Novus' shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixately contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His mouth is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophic which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from behind; this storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress."
8. J. Mill, *The History of British India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
9. As quoted in J. Latin, *Theories of Development: Capitalism, Colonialism and Dependency* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1989), 25.
10. As quoted in H. Arndt, *Theories of Development*, 24.
11. As quoted in H. Arndt, *Economic Development: The History of an Idea* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 39.
12. But see Ajaz Ahmad, *Lives of the Present: Political Essays* (New Delhi: Tulika, 1996) for a nuanced discussion of Marx's views on colonialism and its relationship to capitalist development.
13. Arndt, *Economic Development*, 28.
14. Similar ideas about French or Dutch colonial rule were by no means absent. See Arndt, *Economic Development*, or A. Stoler, "Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of Race and Sexual Morality in 20th Century Colonial Cultures," *American Ethnologist* 16 (1989): 642-58.
15. To remark on the similarity of these themes in much of the colonial literature is not to suggest that there were no writers who did not question the putative benefits that colonial rule conferred on the natives. But these dissenting gestures were either lost in the general effluvia of opinion that saw natives as children needing guidance, which believed in the need to rule with a firm hand, or which saw colonial rule as a necessity in the larger scheme of things. See H. Boeke, *The Evolution of the Netherlands Indies Economy* (New York: Institute of

Pacific Relations, 1946); J. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice* (New York: New York University Press, 1956); and Mill, *The History of British India*.

16. See Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, "The Invention of Development" in *Power of Development*, Jonathan Crush, ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995) 27-43, for a superb review of early writings in Europe on development and the deep historical roots of the concept.
17. As quoted in Esteva, "Development"; 9.
18. Cowen and Shenton, "The Invention of Development."
19. See also R. Cassen, *Does Aid Work? Report to an International Task Force* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) and G. Hancock, *Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige and Corruption of the International Aid Business* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989) for analyses of the aid programs of international development agencies.
20. See the discussion in Arndt, *Economic Development*.
21. Quoted in Kimberly Pfleger, "Modernization and Indigenous Knowledge: Political Ideas for Development or Strategies for Imperialism," *Peace & Change* 21, no. 1 (January 1996): 41-67.
22. P. Clancier, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also the collection of essays in Carol Breckenridge, ed., *Consuming Modernity: Public Culture in South Asian World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
23. The vast literature on development precludes my possibility of even a sketchy coverage in a footnote. I will simply cite some of the texts that I have found useful in gaining an understanding. See I. Adelman and C. Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equality in Developing Countries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); Arndt, *Economic Development*, 1991; C. Bryant and L. White, eds., *Building the Gap* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); R. Chambers, *Rural Development: Putting the Last First* (Harlow: Longman, 1983); M. Lipton, *Why the Poor Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); J. Livingstone, ed., *Approaches to Development Studies* (Aldershot, UK: Gower, 1982); W. Sachs, ed., *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* (London, NY: Pergamon Press, 1981); N. Ullhoff and W. Itchenau, *The Political Economy of Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). Few of the "classical" texts on development adopt a critical view about development—they seem rather to be illustrations of the arguments in this paper. For some recent critical writings about the idea of development see A. Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); J. Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and A. Nandy, "Shamans, Savages, and the Wilderness: On the Audibility of Dissent and the Future of Civilizations," *Alternatives* 14, no. 3 (1989): 263-78.
24. D. Warren, G. Liebenstein, and L. Slikkerveer, "Networking for Indigenous Knowledge," *Indigenous Knowledge and Development Monitor* 1, no. 1 (1993): 2-4.
25. T. Bantui and F. Apffel-Marglin, eds., *Who Will Save the Forests? Knowledge, Power and Environmental Destruction* (London: Zed, 1993).
26. The contradiction in this position is well captured in a statement from W. Arthur Lewis from the colonial period. "The principal objective of the colonial policy should be to enable the colonies to stand on their own legs as soon as possible. This can only be done

through their rapid development," as quoted in Arudi, *Economic Development*: 29. Self-reliant development in the colonies was to be enabled by the policy of the mother country.

27. D. Belslaw, "Taking Indigenous Knowledge Seriously: The Case of Inter-cropping Techniques in East Africa," in *Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Development*, D. Brokensha, D. Warren, and J. Werner, eds. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980): 197-204; D. Brokensha and B. Riley, "Mbere Knowledge of Their Vegetation, and Its Relevance for Their Development," in *Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Development*, Brokensha, Warren, and Werner, eds., 113-29; C. Knight, "Ethnoscience and the African Farmer: Rationale and Strategy (Tanzania)," in *Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Development*, Brokensha, Warren, and Werner, eds., 205-31; P. Leeflang, "Some Observations on Ethnoveterinary Medicine in Northern Nigeria," *Indigenous Knowledge and Development Monitor* 1 (1993): 17-19; J. Massaquoi, "Salt from Silt in Sierra Leone," in M. Gamser, H. Appleton, and N. Carter, eds., *Tinker, Tiller, Technical Change* (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1999); P. Meelian, "Science, Ethnoscience and Agricultural Knowledge Utilization," in *Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Development*, Brokensha, Warren, and Werner, eds., 383-92; C. Moore, "New Shoots from Old Roots," in *Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Development*, Brokensha, Warren, and Werner, eds., 393-97; S. Rajan and M. Selvarajam, "Indigenous Folk Practices among Nilgiri Tribes," *Indigenous Knowledge and Development Monitor* 1, no. 3 (1993): 19-20. For a critical comment on some of the contradictions harbored in the writings on indigenous knowledge theorists see, A. Agrawal, "Disfranchising the Divide between Indigenous and Western Knowledge," *Development and Change* 26, no. 3 (July, 1995): 413-39.

28. Again, it seems important to note that not all writings and theorists promote a vision that specifically desires either to follow the Western path towards development, accept the objectives of development as the appropriate ones, or believe that it is only Western assistance that can promote development in the Third World. See for example, the analysis of Gandhi's thought in J. Selhi, *Gandhi Today* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978). Few such works, however, occupy a prominent space in the thinking about development.

29. Since there is a large literature on different aspects of conservation, I focus in the discussion on the loss of biodiversity and the imperative to protect biodiversity that most conservationists today stress.

30. N. Myers, "Tropical Forest and Their Species: Going, Going . . ." in *Biodiversity*, E. Wilson, ed. (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992), 29. Also see P. Ehrlich and A. Ehrlich, *Extinction: Causes and Consequences of the Disappearance of Species* (New York: Random House, 1981); P. Raven, "We're Killing Our World," keynote paper presented to Annual Conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Chicago, IL, February 1987; St. Louis: Missouri Botanical Garden, 1987; M. Soule and H. Wilcox, eds., *Conservation Biology: The Science of Scarcity and Diversity* (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, 1986); E. Wilson, "Biological Diversity as a Scientific and Ethical Issue" (paper read at a Joint Meeting of the Royal Society and the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 1. Meeting held April 24, 1986 in Philadelphia, 1987); E. Wilson, "The Current State of Biological Diversity," in *Biodiversity*, Wilson, ed., 3-18.

31. See E. Dinerstein and E. Wikramanayake, "Beyond 'Hotspots': How to Prioritize Investments to Conserve Biodiversity in the Indo-Pacific Basin," *Conservation Biology* 7 (1993): 53-65; D. Ellner, ed., *Dynamics of Extinction* (Wiley: New York, 1986); P. Feenstra, *Human Carrying Capacity of the Brazilian Rain Forest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); D. Janzen, "The Uncertain Future of the Tropics," *Natural History* 81 (1972): 80-9; A. Lugo, "Estimating Reductions in the Diversity of Tropical Forest Species,"

in *Biodiversity*, Wilson, ed.; N. Myers, *Conservation of Tropical Moist Forests*, A report prepared for the Committee on Research Priorities in Tropical Biology of the National Research Council (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1980); N. Myers, *The Primary Source: Tropical Forests and Our Future* (W.W. Norton: New York, 1984); N. Myers, "Tropical Forest and Their Species"; M. Robinson, "The Zoo that Is Not: Education for Conservation," *Conservation Biology* 3 (1989): 213-5; Soule and Wilcox, eds., *Conservation Biology*.

32. Wilson, "The Current State of Biological Diversity": 3.

33. N. Myers, "An Expanded Approach to the Problem of Disappearing Species," *Science* 193 (1976): 200.

34. P. Ehrlich, "The Strategy of Conservation, 1980-2000," in M. Soule and B. Wilcox, *Conservation Biology*: 343.

35. M. Robinson, "The Zoo that Is Not": 214.

36. W. Ascher and R. Healy 1990, and Repetto and Gillis 1988, have provided two statements on faulty Third World government policies that lead to environmental depletion. The point is not that these governments do not follow politically motivated policies degrading the environment. It is more that statements posing an objective analysis of environmental trends often tend to conform to a perspective that describes others as the problem rather than focusing on shortcomings closer to home. Further, such analyses often view the problem as a lack of information and communication—as if somehow if Western analysts simply provided better information, the problems would then be solved. [W. Ascher and R. Healy, *Natural Resource Policymaking in Developing Countries: Environment, Economic Growth and Income Distribution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and R. Repetto and M. Gillis, eds., *Public Policies and the Misuse of Forest Resources* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)].

37. N. Myers, "Mass Extinction—Profound Problems, Splendid Opportunity," *Oryx* 22.4 (1988): Similar sentiments can be found in other writings. Consider P. Raven "Winners and Losers in the Twentieth Century Struggle to Survive," in K. Davis and M. Bernstein, eds., *Resources, Environment and Population: Present Knowledge, Future Options* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 260, who singles out the very poor and judges that they use natural resources very destructively. See also J. Li, "Comment: Population Effects on Deforestation and Soil Erosion in China," in *Resources, Environment and Population: Present Knowledge, Future Options*, Davis and Bernstein, eds.; N. Myers, "The World's Forests and Human Populations: The Environmental Interconnections," in *Resources, Environment and Population: Present Knowledge, Future Options*, Davis and Bernstein, eds.; and E. Wilson, "The Current State of Biological Diversity," in *Biodiversity*, E. Wilson, ed., 3-18.

38. Myers, "An Expanded Approach to the Problem of Disappearing Species": 119.

39. Soule and Wilcox, *Conservation Biology*: 466.

40. Wilson, "The Current State . . .": 15.

41. D. Janzen, "The Future of Tropical Ecology," Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 17 (1986): 305-24.

42. D. Westman, "Biology and Conservation: Making the Relevant Connection," *Conservation Biology* 5 (1991): 433.

43. J. H. Schemer, "Biodiversity: Beyond Noah's Ark," *Conservation Biology* 7 (1993): 207. Emphases mine. See also K. Bawa and H. Garrison Wilkes, "Who Shall Speak for Biodiversity?" *Conservation Biology* 6 (1992): 473-4; R. Noss, "Who Will Speak for Biodiversity?" *Conservation Biology* 3 (1989): 202-3; S. Trombulak, "Undergraduate Education and the Next Generation of Conservation Biologists," *Conservation Biology* 8 (1994): 589-91;

G. Vermeij, "Saving the Sea: What We Know and What We Need to Know," *Conservation Biology* 3 (1989): 240-1, for similar assertions about the need for insights that science has to offer if biodiversity is to be protected and managed. Dissenting notes are available in M. Altieri, "How Common Is Our Common Future?" *Conservation Biology* 4 (1990): 102-3; I. Deshukh, "On the Limited Role of Biologists in Biological Conservation," *Conservation Biology* 3 (1989): 321.

44. See E. Harris, *Our World or None: Prescriptions for Survival* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993); National Academy of Sciences (NAS), *Our Earth, Our Future: Our Changing Global Environment* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1990); D. Ray, *Teaching the Planner* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992); S. Schneider and P. Boston, eds., *Stratagems on Goals* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993) for elaborations on the theme of a single future for the inhabitants of the globe.

45. Z. Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

46. D. Goldberg, *Racism Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), 4.

47. J. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

48. K. Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1978), 126.

Exchange

COURTING PEACE: A COMMENT ON HOWLETT

by Peter van den Dungen

In "Case Law Historiography in American Peace History" (*Peace & Change*, January 1997, pp. 49-75), Charles F. Howlett persuasively argues that an important aspect of the history of peace consists of the encounter of peace activists with the law, and that the legal angle can provide a novel, instructive, and stimulating approach to the teaching of peace history and other issues. Indeed, familiarity with the legal system, the testing of its boundaries, the protection it provides as well as the unjustified persecution in which it has occasionally resulted—an awareness of these and similar issues is an important part in the civic education of young democrats. Respect for the law has to go hand in hand with a recognition of its dynamic nature and its progressive development. This applies to municipal law as much as it applies to international law.

During the first half of the 1990s, which the United Nations General Assembly has declared the "Decade of International Law," that international peace movement consisting of lawyers and others, which goes under the name of the World Court Project (WCP), has emphatically demonstrated the importance of the legal approach to disarmament and peace. It was wholly as a result of this popular initiative that the United Nations General Assembly in 1994 (and the World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization in 1993) were persuaded to make use of their prerogative, accorded in article 96 of the UN Charter, to request the International Court of Justice to render its advisory opinion on the legality,